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Undeterrable	  Ideologue	  or	  Deterrable	  Pragmatist?	   	  
An	  Assessment	  of	  the	  Rationality	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran’s	  
Conflict	  Initiating	  Behavior	  
	  
By	  Marcus	  Granlund	  	  	  
ABSTRACT:	  I	  seek	  to	  analyze	  Iran’s	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior	  by	  means	  of	  assessing	  the	  state’s	  national	  capabilities	  relative	  to	  its	  primary	  targets	  of	  aggression	  in	  order	  to	  discern	  whether	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran	  has	  experienced	  a	  tendency	  to	  initiate	  conflict	  against	  relatively	  more	  powerful	  states.	  Rooted	  in	  the	  fundamental	  assumption	  that	  a	  rational	  state	  does	  not	  initiate	  conflict	  against	  other	  states	  that	  are	  significantly	  more	  powerful	  than	  it	  is,	  the	  analysis	  is	  conducted	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  shedding	  light	  on	  whether	  Iran’s	  conflict-­‐initiating	  behavior	  has	  been	  rational	  post-­‐1979	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  state’s	  deterrability.	  The	  study	  is	  conducted	  by	  first	  employing	  a	  cross-­‐temporal	  within-­‐case	  study	  that	  looks	  at	  fluctuations	  in	  the	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  militarized	  interstate	  disputes	  (MIDs)	  initiated	  by	  Iran	  across	  four	  distinct	  periods	  of	  time:	  1957-­‐1967,	  1968-­‐1978,	  1979-­‐1989	  and	  1990-­‐2000.	  Secondly,	  Iran’s	  fluctuations	  are	  compared	  to	  those	  experienced	  by	  two	  other	  revolutionary	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China,	  during	  the	  time	  period	  that	  extends	  from	  two	  decades	  before	  their	  respective	  revolutions	  to	  two	  decades	  after.	  Lastly,	  I	  create	  a	  control	  variable	  comprising	  20	  randomized	  MIDs	  where	  the	  initiator’s	  Composite	  Index	  of	  National	  Capability	  (CINC)	  score	  falls	  within	  the	  range	  of	  Iran’s	  over	  the	  course	  of	  its	  history	  during	  the	  period	  1957-­‐2000.	  The	  study	  finds	  that	  Iran’s	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior	  became	  significantly	  less	  rational	  in	  the	  decade	  immediately	  succeeding	  the	  revolution,	  but	  that	  it	  thereafter	  became	  increasingly	  rational	  and	  less	  hostile.	  Importantly,	  Iranian	  conflict	  initiations	  have,	  on	  average,	  occurred	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  rational	  behavior	  across	  each	  of	  the	  four	  time	  periods	  considered,	  including	  post-­‐1979.	  The	  Islamic	  Republic	  thus	  fits	  the	  mold	  of	  a	  deterrable	  pragmatist	  rather	  than	  an	  undeterrable	  ideologue.	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  Iran’s	  leadership	  comprises	  a	  group	  of	  extreme	  fanatical	  Muslims	  who	  believe	  that	  their	  messianic	  times	  have	  arrived.	  Though	  Russia	  and	  the	  US	  both	  had	  nuclear	  weapons,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  they	  would	  never	  use	  them	  because	  of	  MAD.	  	  Each	  side	  knew	  it	  would	  be	  destroyed	  if	  it	  would	  attack	  the	  other.	  	  But	  with	  these	  people	  in	  Iran	  MAD	  is	  not	  a	  deterrent	  factor,	  but	  rather	  an	  inducement	  (Yedidya	  2012).	  
–	  Bernard	  Lewis,	  Professor	  Emeritus	  (Princeton	  University)	  
	  Whoever	  gets	  nuclear	  weapons	  behaves	  with	  caution	  and	  moderation.	  Every	  country	  –	  whether	  they	  are	  countries	  we	  trust	  and	  think	  of	  as	  being	  highly	  responsible,	  like	  Britain,	  or	  countries	  that	  we	  distrust	  greatly,	  and	  for	  very	  good	  reasons,	  like	  China	  during	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  –	  behaves	  with	  such	  caution	  (Sagan	  and	  Waltz	  2007).	  
–	  Kenneth	  Waltz	  
	  
I.	  Introduction	  
	   Israeli	  Prime	  Minister	  Benjamin	  Netanyahu	  is	  certain	  about	  Iran.	  In	  viewing	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  as	  a	  "messianic,	  apocalyptic,	  radical	  cult"	  that	  is	  "wild	  in	  its	  ambition	  and	  aggression"	  (Haaretz	  2013),	  Netanyahu	  regards	  the	  regime	  as	  an	  undeterrable	  ideologue	  and	  stresses	  the	  immensity	  of	  the	  dangers	  that	  he	  associates	  with	  a	  potential	  Iranian	  nuclear	  weapon.	  Contrary	  to	  Netanyahu’s	  alarmism,	  the	  Obama	  administration	  has	  displayed	  considerable	  faith	  in	  the	  rationality	  of	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  by	  pursuing	  a	  long-­‐term	  diplomatic	  solution	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  country’s	  uranium	  enrichment	  program.	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The	  extent	  of	  the	  disagreement	  over	  the	  deterrability	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  that	  is	  evident	  in	  discussions	  regarding	  a	  possible	  Iranian	  WMD	  illuminates	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  empirical	  assessment	  of	  the	  regime’s	  rationality.	  This	  empirical	  gap	  is	  remarkable	  considering	  the	  disastrous	  impact	  that	  an	  irrational	  nuclear	  actor	  could	  have	  on	  the	  international	  stage.	  A	  nuclear	  Iran	  deemed	  to	  be	  undeterrable	  could	  indeed	  destabilize	  the	  entire	  international	  system	  by	  carrying	  out	  the	  annihilation	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israel	  and	  proceeding	  to	  hold	  the	  world	  at	  ransom	  to	  its	  demands.	  In	  expanding	  upon	  the	  methodological	  framework	  of	  a	  previous	  study	  made	  by	  Joseph	  Grieco	  that	  assessed	  the	  alleged	  belligerence	  of	  Iran	  post-­‐1979,	  I	  seek	  to	  analyze	  Iran’s	  national	  capabilities	  relative	  to	  its	  primary	  targets	  of	  aggression	  in	  conflicts	  that	  it	  has	  itself	  initiated	  in	  order	  to	  discern	  whether	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  has	  experienced	  a	  tendency	  to	  initiate	  conflict	  against	  relatively	  more	  powerful	  states.	  Rooted	  in	  the	  fundamental	  assumption	  that	  a	  rational	  state	  does	  not	  initiate	  conflict	  against	  states	  that	  are	  significantly	  more	  powerful	  than	  it	  is,	  the	  analysis	  is	  conducted	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  shedding	  light	  on	  whether	  Iran’s	  conflict-­‐initiating	  behavior	  has	  been	  rational	  post-­‐1979	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  state’s	  deterrability.	  The	  study	  is	  conducted	  by	  first	  employing	  a	  cross-­‐temporal	  within-­‐case	  study	  that	  seeks	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  the	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  militarized	  interstate	  disputes	  (MIDs)	  initiated	  by	  Iran	  has	  changed	  over	  time	  and,	  in	  particular,	  post-­‐revolution.	  I	  assume	  that	  the	  level	  of	  rationality	  inherent	  in	  conflict	  initiations	  can	  be	  measured	  by	  computing	  the	  primary	  defender’s	  national	  capabilities	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  total	  capabilities	  of	  both	  the	  initiator	  and	  target,	  which	  I	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  dispute’s	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  (alternatively,	  its	  CINC	  percentage).	  I	  thus	  proceed	  to	  analyze	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Iran’s	  primary	  targets	  of	  aggression’s	  share	  of	  total	  capabilities	  across	  four	  distinct	  periods	  of	  time:	  1957-­‐1967	  (two	  decades	  before	  the	  revolution),	  1968-­‐1978	  (one	  decade	  before	  the	  revolution),	  1979-­‐1989	  (one	  decade	  after	  the	  revolution)	  and	  1990-­‐2000	  (two	  decades	  after	  the	  revolution).	  Thereafter,	  I	  compare	  Iran’s	  fluctuations	  in	  the	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  of	  its	  conflict	  initiations	  with	  two	  other	  revolutionary	  authoritarian	  states,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China.	  Lastly,	  I	  create	  a	  control	  variable	  comprising	  20	  randomized	  MIDs	  where	  the	  initiator’s	  Composite	  Index	  of	  National	  Capability	  (CINC)	  score	  falls	  within	  the	  range	  of	  Iran’s	  over	  the	  course	  of	  its	  history	  during	  the	  period	  1957-­‐2000.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  paper’s	  scope,	  the	  empirical	  results	  are	  based	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  302	  initiations	  of	  MIDs,	  which	  primarily	  comprise	  Iran,	  China	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  initiated	  disputes	  during	  the	  period	  of	  time	  that	  extends	  from	  two	  decades	  before	  their	  respective	  revolutions	  up	  until	  two	  decades	  after.	  The	  total	  number	  of	  MIDs	  under	  consideration	  also	  includes	  20	  randomized	  conflicts	  ranging	  from	  threats	  to	  use	  force	  to	  outright	  war,	  which	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  study’s	  control	  variable.	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II.	  Literature	  Review	  	   The	  possibility	  of	  an	  Iranian	  nuclear	  weapon	  in	  the	  not	  too	  distant	  future	  has	  elicited	  considerable	  debate	  among	  scholars,	  decision-­‐makers	  and	  policy	  commentators,	  having	  grasped	  the	  attention	  of	  much	  of	  the	  international	  relations	  community.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  international	  community’s	  qualms	  over	  an	  Iranian	  nuclear	  capability	  lies	  the	  much-­‐disputed	  deterrability	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  as	  a	  fundamentalist,	  revolutionary,	  and	  authoritarian	  regime	  viewed	  as	  comprising	  religious	  zealots,	  by	  some,	  and	  deterrable	  pragmatists	  by	  others.	  On	  one	  side	  of	  the	  debate,	  we	  find	  deterrence	  advocates,	  including	  the	  likes	  of	  Barry	  Posen	  and	  Kenneth	  Waltz,	  who	  maintain	  that	  Iran	  fits	  the	  mold	  of	  a	  rational	  actor.	  According	  to	  Posen,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Iran’s	  inflammatory	  rhetoric	  towards	  Israel,	  the	  regime	  seems	  deliberate	  and	  cautious	  in	  the	  way	  that	  it	  uses	  limited	  forms	  of	  violence	  to	  promote	  its	  national	  interests.	  In	  addition,	  he	  regards	  Iran’s	  rhetoric	  towards	  Israel	  as	  a	  means	  by	  which	  the	  regime	  attempts	  to	  bolster	  its	  own	  legitimacy,	  rather	  than	  comprising	  sincere	  threats	  aimed	  at	  eradicating	  Israel	  from	  the	  face	  of	  the	  earth.	  Accordingly,	  Posen	  is	  convinced	  that	  the	  international	  community,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  in	  particular,	  would	  be	  able	  to	  deter	  Iranian	  aggression	  if	  it	  were	  to	  acquire	  nuclear	  weapons	  by	  means	  of	  making	  the	  costs	  of	  belligerence	  excessively	  prohibitive	  (Posen	  2006a).	  As	  such,	  Posen	  is	  a	  firm	  advocate	  for	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  mutually	  assured	  destruction	  (MAD).	  Posen	  identifies	  three	  potential	  pathways	  through	  which	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  could	  facilitate	  Iranian	  aggression,	  but	  whose	  validity	  he	  severely	  questions	  contending	  that	  that	  “the	  first	  two…	  are	  improbable	  and	  the	  third	  is	  manageable”	  (Posen	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2006b).	  The	  first	  two	  refer	  to	  the	  assertion	  made	  that	  Iran	  could	  give	  nuclear	  weapons	  to	  non-­‐state	  actors	  and	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  nuclear	  Iran	  would	  be	  capable	  of	  blackmailing	  other	  states	  into	  submission,	  respectively.	  Posen	  asserts	  that	  facilitating	  the	  acquisition	  of	  a	  nuclear	  weapon	  by	  a	  terrorist	  organization	  is	  extremely	  unlikely	  as	  it,	  he	  points	  out,	  “serves	  no	  strategic	  purpose,	  invites	  retaliation	  and	  cannot	  be	  controlled”.	  In	  the	  event	  that	  a	  terrorist	  organization	  would	  engage	  in	  a	  nuclear	  attack	  and	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  weapons	  would	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  Iran,	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  would	  surely	  face	  the	  full	  force	  of	  a	  nuclear	  retaliation	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  Posen	  also	  dismisses	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  nuclear	  Iran	  would	  be	  able	  to	  make	  other	  states	  in	  the	  region	  heed	  to	  the	  regime’s	  demands	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  Iran	  would	  be	  attentive	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  not	  allow	  for	  such	  actions	  to	  go	  unpunished	  (Posen	  2006a).	  The	  third	  scenario	  outlined	  by	  Posen	  relates	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  nuclear	  Iran	  would	  feel	  less	  constrained	  in	  engaging	  in	  subversion	  or	  conventional	  aggression.	  	  He	  however	  views	  the	  notion	  that	  Iran	  would	  be	  able	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  diffuse	  threat	  of	  nuclear	  escalation	  in	  order	  to	  deter	  others,	  thus	  enabling	  it	  to	  roam	  freely,	  as	  being	  far	  from	  certain	  (Posen	  2006b).	  He	  points	  out	  that	  a	  nuclear	  state	  also	  becomes	  a	  potential	  nuclear	  target	  and	  thus	  doubts	  the	  feasibility	  of	  a	  more	  belligerent	  Iran	  in	  this	  regard,	  thus	  making	  the	  fundamental	  assumption	  that	  Iran	  is	  rational	  and,	  consequently,	  deterrable.	  Waltz,	  similarly,	  stresses	  what	  he	  perceives	  as	  the	  rationality	  of	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  in	  debates	  concerning	  a	  possible	  Iranian	  nuclear	  capability.	  He	  notes	  that	  he	  does	  not	  know	  of	  “many	  religiously-­‐oriented	  people	  that	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  will	  result	  in	  the	  massacre	  of	  thousands	  of	  people”	  (Sagan	  and	  Waltz	  2007)	  –	  a	  statement	  that	  is	  highly	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indicative	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  rationality	  that	  deterrence	  advocates	  attribute	  to	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran.	  Waltz,	  in	  particular,	  points	  to	  historical	  precedents,	  focusing	  his	  attention	  on	  the	  United	  States’	  experience	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  China	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  In	  doing	  so,	  he	  defends	  the	  United	  States’	  ability	  to	  deter	  Iran,	  a	  relatively	  small	  country,	  given	  that	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  capable	  of	  deterring	  bigger	  powers	  in	  the	  past	  (Sagan	  and	  Waltz	  2007).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Allan	  Stam	  and	  Dan	  Reiter	  have	  contended	  that	  autocratic	  regimes	  are	  more	  willing	  than	  democratic	  states	  to	  initiate	  risky	  wars	  against	  adversaries	  that	  have	  a	  greater	  chance	  of	  winning.	  In	  other	  words,	  autocracies	  are	  said	  to	  have	  systematically	  lower	  conflict	  initiation	  thresholds	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  prospect	  of	  being	  victorious	  in	  conflicts.	  This,	  Stam	  and	  Reiter	  argue,	  is	  because	  democratic	  states	  by	  their	  very	  nature	  are	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  public	  discontent,	  which	  produces	  a	  greater	  sense	  of	  reluctance	  on	  their	  behalf	  with	  regards	  to	  initiating	  conflicts	  that	  they	  cannot	  be	  relatively	  certain	  of	  being	  victorious	  in	  (Reiter	  and	  Stam	  1967).	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  Stam	  and	  Reiter’s	  observations	  and	  the	  definition	  of	  rational	  states	  contained	  herein,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  there	  might	  be	  grounds	  for	  doubting	  the	  rationality	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  theocracy	  that	  is	  the	  Islamic	  Republic.	  Bernard	  Lewis	  and	  Norman	  Podhoretz	  are	  among	  the	  more	  prominent	  critics	  of	  the	  alleged	  rationality	  of	  Iran	  that	  is	  at	  the	  root	  of	  Posen	  and	  Waltz’s	  confidence	  in	  MAD.	  To	  Lewis	  and	  Podhoretz,	  the	  consequences	  of	  an	  Iranian	  nuclear	  weapon	  cannot	  be	  assessed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  historical	  precedents	  since	  Iran	  constitutes	  a	  uniquely	  irrational	  actor.	  This,	  they	  argue,	  is	  because	  Iran	  is	  ruled	  by	  a	  unique	  fundamentalist,	  revolutionary,	  and	  authoritarian	  regime	  whose	  religious	  convictions	  they	  perceive	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  
	   9	  
having	  imposed	  significant	  constraints	  on	  the	  level	  of	  rationality	  with	  which	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  has	  been	  able	  to	  conduct	  foreign	  policy.	  Lewis	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  argue	  that,	  to	  Iran,	  the	  prospect	  of	  MAD	  comprises	  an	  inducement	  rather	  than	  a	  constraint.	  He	  comes	  to	  this	  conclusion	  as	  a	  result	  of	  attributing	  an	  apocalyptic	  worldview	  to	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  as	  well	  as	  claiming	  that	  it	  suffers	  from	  a	  martyrdom	  complex,	  which	  has	  transformed	  the	  state	  into	  a	  highly	  irrational	  and,	  indeed,	  suicidal	  actor.	  Lewis	  views	  the	  regime’s	  apocalyptic	  worldview	  as	  being	  rooted	  in	  the	  Shiite	  belief	  in	  the	  return	  of	  the	  Hidden	  Imam,	  which	  will	  bring	  victory	  to	  the	  forces	  of	  good	  over	  evil.	  He	  moreover	  regards	  the	  Islamic	  Republic’s	  martyrdom	  complex	  as	  being	  evident	  in	  the	  state’s	  rhetoric,	  pointing	  to	  a	  statement	  by	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini	  found	  in	  an	  Iranian	  schoolbook	  that	  reads:	  “If	  the	  world-­‐devourers	  wish	  to	  stand	  against	  our	  religion,	  we	  will	  stand	  against	  their	  whole	  world	  and	  will	  not	  cease	  until	  the	  annihilation	  of	  all	  of	  them.	  Either	  we	  all	  become	  free,	  or	  we	  will	  go	  to	  the	  greater	  freedom	  which	  is	  martyrdom”	  (Lewis	  2006).	  Norman	  Podhoretz	  likens	  the	  West’s	  struggle	  with	  Iran	  to	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  emphasizing	  its	  ideological	  roots,	  arguing	  that	  Western	  democratic	  values	  have	  become	  pitted	  against	  a	  form	  of	  totalitarian	  Islamofascism,	  most	  prominently	  personified	  by	  the	  Islamic	  Republic.	  Podhoretz,	  like	  Lewis,	  dismisses	  the	  idea	  that	  Iran	  is	  deterrable,	  invoking	  statements	  made	  by	  Robert	  G.	  Joseph,	  the	  US	  Special	  Envoy	  for	  Nuclear	  Non-­‐Proliferation,	  that	  supposes	  that	  “we	  could	  wake	  up	  one	  morning	  to	  find	  that	  Iran	  is	  holding	  Berlin,	  Paris	  or	  London	  hostage	  to	  whatever	  its	  demands	  are”,	  if	  it	  were	  to	  go	  nuclear.	  In	  comparing	  Hitler	  to	  Ahmadinejad,	  two	  revolutionary	  leaders	  who	  sought	  to	  overturn	  the	  international	  system,	  Podhoretz	  is	  convinced	  that	  a	  nuclear	  Iran	  will	  have	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no	  problems	  with	  ceding	  nuclear	  weapons	  to	  terrorist	  organizations	  and	  is	  certain	  that	  Iran	  would	  destroy	  the	  state	  of	  Israel	  through	  the	  use	  of	  WMDs,	  if	  it	  were	  to	  acquire	  them	  (Podhoretz	  2007).	  In	  this	  regard,	  Podhoretz	  fails	  to	  see	  the	  cautious	  and	  deliberate	  nuclear	  Iran	  that	  is	  highly	  aware	  of	  and	  attentive	  to	  the	  United	  States’	  national	  capabilities	  advocated	  for	  by	  Posen	  and	  Waltz.	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III.	  Method	  	   The	  Correlates	  of	  War	  Project’s	  Militarized	  Interstate	  Disputes	  (v3.0)	  data	  set	  and	  the	  National	  Material	  Capabilities	  (v4.0)	  data	  set	  comprise	  the	  empirical	  foundation	  for	  my	  analysis	  of	  Iran’s	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior,	  from	  which	  I	  compute	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  scores	  that	  are	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  my	  analysis.	  The	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  represents	  the	  defender’s	  percentage	  share	  of	  the	  total	  capabilities	  of	  both	  initiator	  and	  defender	  in	  militarized	  interstate	  disputes.	  It	  is	  calculated	  by	  dividing	  the	  defender’s	  CINC	  score	  by	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  defender	  and	  initiator’s	  CINC	  scores	  (expressed	  as	  a	  percentage).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  calculation’s	  designated	  defender	  constitutes	  the	  primary	  target	  of	  aggression.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  measure	  of	  the	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  utilized	  in	  this	  study	  does	  not	  account	  for	  alliance	  formations	  as	  parties	  with	  secondary	  interests	  in	  the	  MIDs	  under	  consideration	  have	  been	  excluded.	  The	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  scores	  are	  subsequently	  analyzed	  in	  three	  stages.	  First,	  I	  employ	  a	  cross-­‐temporal	  within-­‐case	  study	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Iran.	  Accordingly,	  fluctuations	  in	  the	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  MIDs	  initiated	  by	  Iran	  are	  assessed	  across	  four	  distinct	  periods	  of	  time	  in	  Iranian	  history;	  1957-­‐1967	  (two	  decades	  before	  the	  revolution),	  1968-­‐1978	  (one	  decade	  before	  the	  revolution),	  1979-­‐1989	  (one	  decade	  after	  the	  revolution)	  and	  1990-­‐2000	  (two	  decades	  after	  the	  revolution),	  with	  particular	  attention	  paid	  to	  the	  latter	  two	  time	  periods.	  A	  total	  of	  112	  initiated	  MIDs	  are	  considered,	  representing	  all	  MIDs	  initiated	  by	  Iran	  during	  the	  period	  1957-­‐2000,	  from	  which	  average	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  scores	  are	  computed	  for	  each	  of	  the	  respective	  decades	  and	  subsequently	  compared.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  analysis	  is	  to	  assess	  whether	  Iran	  has	  experienced	  systematically	  higher	  average	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  scores	  post-­‐
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1979	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  has	  become	  more	  or	  less	  rational	  in	  its	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior.	  Second,	  I	  compare	  Iran’s	  fluctuations	  over	  time	  in	  the	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  to	  those	  experienced	  by	  China	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  two	  other	  revolutionary	  authoritarian	  regimes,	  during	  the	  time	  period	  that	  extends	  from	  two	  decades	  before	  their	  respective	  revolutions	  to	  two	  decades	  after.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  China,	  a	  total	  of	  93	  MIDs	  are	  considered,	  representing	  all	  MIDs	  initiated	  by	  China	  during	  the	  period	  1927-­‐1970,	  from	  which	  average	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  scores	  are	  computed	  for	  each	  of	  the	  respective	  decades.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  a	  total	  of	  77	  MIDs	  are	  analyzed,	  representing	  all	  MIDs	  initiated	  by	  the	  USSR	  during	  the	  period	  1895-­‐1938.	  The	  CINC	  percentages	  experienced	  by	  both	  regimes	  for	  each	  of	  the	  decades	  are	  subsequently	  compared	  to	  Iran	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  assertion	  made	  by	  critics	  of	  MAD	  who	  contend	  that	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  comprises	  a	  uniquely	  irrational	  revolutionary	  state	  that	  thus	  cannot	  be	  analyzed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  historical	  precedents.	  Third,	  I	  invoke	  a	  control	  variable	  comprising	  20	  randomized	  militarized	  interstate	  disputes,	  where	  I	  control	  for	  the	  initiator’s	  CINC	  score	  so	  that	  it	  falls	  within	  the	  range	  of	  Iran’s	  CINC	  score	  for	  the	  period	  1957-­‐2000.	  A	  control	  variable	  is	  created	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  standardized	  so-­‐called	  “irrationality	  threshold”	  for	  the	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power,	  beyond	  which	  conflict	  initiations	  are	  deemed	  irrational.	  The	  results	  indicate	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  threshold	  at	  a	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  score	  of	  53.5%,	  meaning	  that	  conflicts	  that	  are	  initiated	  against	  states	  that	  possess	  greater	  than	  53.5%	  of	  the	  total	  capabilities	  in	  a	  conflict	  are	  considered	  irrational.	  The	  purpose	  of	  creating	  a	  control	  variable	  is	  to	  moderate	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  limitations	  inherent	  in	  my	  underlying	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assumption	  with	  regards	  to	  what	  rational	  behavior	  on	  behalf	  of	  nation-­‐states	  entails.	  Inevitably	  states	  with	  exceptionally	  high	  CINC	  scores,	  signifying	  comparatively	  very	  powerful	  states,	  will	  have	  significantly	  fewer	  potential	  irrational	  adversaries.	  As	  such,	  creating	  a	  control	  variable	  that	  comprises	  MIDs	  initiated	  by	  states	  with	  CINC	  scores	  that	  are	  similar	  to	  Iran’s	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  control	  for	  this	  limitation	  and	  better	  understand	  what	  constitutes	  a	  ‘normal’	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  militarized	  interstate	  disputes.	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IV.	  Results	  &	  Discussion	  
Results	  The	  empirical	  data	  suggests	  that	  Iran’s	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior	  became	  significantly	  less	  rational	  in	  the	  decade	  immediately	  succeeding	  the	  revolution,	  as	  well	  as	  more	  violent,	  but	  that	  it	  since	  1989	  has	  become	  increasingly	  rational	  and	  less	  hostile.	  For	  the	  period	  1979-­‐1989,	  the	  findings	  suggest	  that	  the	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  Iranian	  conflict	  initiations	  shifted	  towards	  the	  primary	  target	  of	  aggression,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  a	  higher	  average	  CINC	  percentage	  for	  the	  decade	  immediately	  succeeding	  the	  revolution	  in	  Appendix	  III.	  The	  higher	  average	  score	  was	  driven	  by	  an	  increase	  in	  irrational	  MIDs	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  total	  conflict	  initiations	  (Appendix	  II),	  primarily	  initiated	  against	  Western	  powers,	  including	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  France	  and	  West	  Germany,	  but	  also	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  results	  furthermore	  point	  to	  Iran’s	  foreign	  policy	  having	  undergone	  a	  period	  of	  moderation	  two	  decades	  after	  the	  revolution	  with	  the	  result	  that	  its	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior	  became	  more	  rational.	  The	  results	  indicate	  that	  the	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  increasingly	  tilted	  towards	  Iran	  as	  a	  result	  of	  convalescence	  from	  the	  fever	  of	  revolution	  (Brinton	  1952),	  which	  reduced	  Iran’s	  hostility	  towards	  significantly	  more	  powerful	  states,	  primarily	  having	  initiated	  disputes	  against	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan,	  and	  other	  Middle	  Eastern	  states,	  during	  this	  time.	  This	  higher	  level	  of	  rationality	  characterizing	  Iran’s	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior	  is	  evidenced	  by	  a	  lower	  average	  CINC	  percentage	  two	  decades	  after	  the	  revolution	  (Appendix	  III),	  and	  is	  reinforced	  by	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  average	  levels	  of	  hostility	  reached	  in	  irrational	  conflict	  initiations	  (Appendix	  II).	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It	  is	  particularly	  worth	  noting	  that	  Iran’s	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior,	  interestingly,	  has	  lied	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  rational	  behavior	  across	  all	  four	  periods	  of	  time	  under	  consideration.	  The	  irrationality	  threshold	  comprising	  the	  control	  variable	  is	  seen	  to	  exceed	  Iran’s	  average	  CINC	  percentage	  across	  each	  of	  the	  four	  decades	  considered	  (Appendix	  III).	  In	  fact,	  the	  uniquely	  irrational	  autocratic	  theocracy	  that	  Bernard	  Lewis	  and	  Norman	  Podhoretz	  have	  found	  in	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  existed	  during	  the	  timespan	  covered	  by	  the	  Correlates	  of	  War	  Project’s	  datasets.	  This	  observation	  is	  further	  supported	  by	  the	  empirical	  results	  derived	  from	  the	  between-­‐case	  comparison	  with	  China	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  which	  point	  to	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  convergence	  having	  occurred	  two	  decades	  after	  their	  respective	  revolutions	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  level	  of	  rationality	  inherent	  in	  their	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior	  (Appendix	  III).	  
Discussion	  In	  his	  book	  The	  Anatomy	  of	  Revolution,	  Crane	  Brinton	  assessed	  the	  English,	  American,	  French	  and	  Russian	  revolutions	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  identifying	  a	  set	  of	  phases	  that	  characterize	  the	  revolutionary	  process.	  He	  found	  that	  the	  immediate	  post-­‐revolutionary	  period	  in	  these	  countries	  generally	  followed	  a	  pattern	  in	  which	  radical	  forces	  triumphed	  over	  moderates	  in	  a	  struggle	  for	  power	  and	  subsequently	  implemented	  a	  reign	  of	  terror,	  with	  America	  being	  the	  exception.	  Fanatically	  devoted	  to	  their	  cause	  and	  against	  all	  forms	  of	  perceived	  immorality	  in	  their	  newly	  established	  republic	  of	  virtue,	  a	  forceful	  minority	  would	  instigate	  purges	  of	  government	  ranks	  followed	  by	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  revolutionary	  regime	  that	  would	  resort	  to	  violence	  as	  a	  means	  by	  which	  to	  resolve	  its	  problems	  (Brinton	  1952).	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In	  the	  case	  of	  Iran,	  the	  period	  1979-­‐1989	  very	  much	  complies	  with	  Brinton’s	  analysis.	  Having	  commenced	  as	  an	  anti-­‐dictatorial	  mass	  movement	  rooted	  in	  a	  broad	  coalition	  of	  anti-­‐Shah	  forces,	  the	  1979	  revolution	  soon	  spiraled	  into	  a	  fundamentalist	  Islamic	  power	  struggle	  (Zabih	  1982).	  In	  defiance	  of	  Shapour	  Bakhtiar,	  the	  last	  Prime	  Minister	  under	  the	  Shah	  and	  moderate	  opponent	  of	  the	  Shah’s	  regime,	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini	  appointed	  his	  own	  competing	  interim	  Prime	  Minister	  upon	  his	  arrival	  in	  February	  1979	  (Nikou	  2013),	  proclaiming:	  “This	  is	  not	  an	  ordinary	  government.	  It	  is	  a	  government	  based	  on	  the	  sharia…	  Revolt	  against	  God's	  government	  is	  a	  revolt	  against	  God.	  Revolt	  against	  God	  is	  blasphemy”	  (Moin	  2000).	  	  Khomeini’s	  proclamation	  very	  much	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  reign	  of	  terror	  and	  the	  purges	  that	  he	  were	  to	  be	  able	  to	  instigate	  himself	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  velayat-­‐e	  faqih,	  whereby	  Khomeini	  provided	  ‘political	  guardianship’	  for	  the	  Iranian	  people	  through	  assuming	  the	  position	  of	  Supreme	  Leader.	  The	  formulation	  of	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  decade	  after	  the	  revolution	  was	  thus	  very	  much	  shaped	  by	  Iran’s	  revolutionary	  experience,	  which	  had	  severely	  damaged	  the	  state’s	  channels	  of	  communication.	  As	  is	  the	  case	  with	  most	  revolutions,	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution	  brought	  with	  it	  the	  replacement	  of	  virtually	  everyone	  who	  had	  experience	  with	  foreign	  affairs,	  not	  least	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  purging	  of	  public	  officials	  with	  ties	  to	  the	  pre-­‐revolutionary	  regime.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  became	  uncertain	  about	  other	  states’	  intentions	  as	  a	  result	  of	  ultimately	  having	  had	  no	  previous	  direct	  experience	  in	  dealing	  with	  them.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  experience,	  the	  state,	  as	  pointed	  out	  by	  Stephen	  Walt,	  tends	  to	  fall	  back	  on	  ideology,	  which	  in	  the	  case	  of	  revolutionary	  regimes	  portrays	  outsiders	  as	  hostile	  (Walt	  1992).	  This	  heightened	  sense	  of	  insecurity	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on	  behalf	  of	  Iran	  in	  the	  decade	  after	  the	  revolution,	  as	  such,	  served	  to	  increase	  the	  total	  number	  of	  conflict	  initiations	  during	  the	  1979-­‐1989	  period	  (Appendix	  I)	  and	  the	  proportion	  of	  irrational	  disputes	  as	  well	  as	  their	  average	  hostility	  level	  (Appendix	  II).	  Fueled	  by	  the	  revolutionary	  fervor	  that	  permeated	  public	  discourse	  at	  the	  time	  and	  at	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  “Neither	  East	  nor	  West	  but	  the	  Islamic	  Republic”	  approach	  to	  foreign	  policy,	  Iran’s	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior	  on	  the	  whole	  became	  less	  rational	  in	  the	  decade	  after	  the	  revolution.	  This	  was	  in	  large	  part	  because	  the	  regime’s	  “Neither	  East	  nor	  West”	  stance	  caused	  friction	  with	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Iron	  Curtain,	  and	  with	  the	  West	  in	  particular.	  The	  revolution	  was	  partially	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  Westernization	  attributed	  to	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  Shah	  (Rakel	  2007)	  and,	  consequently,	  a	  harsh	  anti-­‐Western	  stance	  thus	  became	  an	  integral	  component	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  regime,	  coming	  to	  serve	  as	  an	  important	  legitimizing	  factor.	  Accordingly,	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  initiated	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  conflict	  initiations	  against	  substantially	  more	  powerful	  Western	  powers	  (including	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  France	  and	  West	  Germany,	  amongst	  others),	  which	  drove	  the	  reduction	  in	  the	  rationality	  of	  Iran’s	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior	  in	  the	  decade	  succeeding	  the	  revolution.	  While	  Iranian	  conflict	  initiations	  on	  average	  became	  less	  rational	  during	  the	  1979-­‐1989	  period,	  it	  is	  however	  important	  to	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  actions	  taken	  by	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  and	  those	  taken	  independently	  by	  government	  organizations.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  rationality	  of	  Iranian	  conflict	  initiations	  declined	  is	  arguably	  somewhat	  exaggerated	  in	  the	  empirical	  data	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  such	  a	  distinction.	  As	  mentioned,	  the	  vast	  replacement	  of	  officials	  associated	  with	  the	  Shah’s	  regime	  incurred	  significant	  damage	  to	  the	  Islamic	  Republic’s	  normal	  channels	  of	  communication.	  This,	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  
	   18	  
turn,	  made	  independent	  action	  by	  security	  agencies	  or	  public	  officials	  without	  explicit	  government	  sanction	  increasingly	  likely.	  This	  seems	  to	  for	  example	  have	  been	  the	  case	  in	  May	  1987	  when	  the	  second-­‐ranking	  British	  diplomat	  in	  Iran	  was	  pulled	  out	  of	  his	  car	  and	  beaten	  after	  an	  Iranian	  consular	  officer	  had	  been	  arrested	  in	  Manchester,	  accused	  of	  shoplifting	  (Bakhash	  2001).	  In	  this	  regard,	  the	  reduced	  rationality	  of	  Iranian	  conflict	  initiations	  evidenced	  by	  a	  lower	  CINC	  percentage	  for	  the	  decade	  after	  the	  revolution	  (Appendix	  III)	  may	  be	  slightly	  exaggerated	  by	  the	  empirical	  data.	  According	  to	  Brinton’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  stages	  of	  revolutions,	  the	  reign	  of	  terror	  characterizing	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  the	  post-­‐revolutionary	  period	  is	  succeeded	  by	  a	  phase	  of	  recovery,	  or	  a	  Thermidorian	  reaction,	  whereby	  revolutionary	  principles	  are	  relaxed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  convalescence	  from	  the	  fever	  of	  revolution.	  In	  reaction	  to	  the	  violence	  of	  the	  reign	  of	  terror,	  a	  period	  of	  moderation	  emerges.	  The	  most	  violent	  public	  figures	  are	  eliminated,	  while	  some	  of	  the	  moderates	  having	  been	  imprisoned	  during	  the	  reign	  of	  terror	  are	  gradually	  pardoned	  and	  given	  amnesty.	  In	  addition,	  this	  phase	  of	  recovery	  is	  generally	  characterized	  by	  dire	  economic	  circumstances	  (Brinton	  1952),	  which	  in	  part	  drive	  the	  reduction	  in	  revolutionary	  fervor.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Iran,	  the	  period	  1990-­‐2000	  followed	  a	  similar	  pattern	  to	  that	  of	  Brinton’s	  convalescence,	  although	  it	  did	  not	  take	  the	  shape	  of	  a	  full	  Thermidorian	  reaction.	  Gradually	  appearing	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  onward	  in	  the	  form	  of	  increasing	  pragmatism	  in	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policy	  (Rakel	  2007),	  a	  period	  of	  moderation	  emerged,	  especially	  as	  the	  war	  with	  Iraq	  had	  drained	  revolutionary	  fervor,	  the	  Iranian	  people’s	  morale	  and	  the	  country’s	  financial	  resources.	  The	  end	  of	  the	  war	  in	  1988	  combined	  with	  the	  country’s	  economic	  suffering	  prompted	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  
	   19	  
authorize	  a	  five-­‐year	  economic	  plan	  that	  allowed	  the	  government	  to	  borrow	  from	  abroad.	  The	  death	  of	  Khomeini	  in	  1989	  furthermore	  removed	  a	  powerful,	  domineering	  figure	  in	  Iranian	  politics,	  which	  allowed	  for	  a	  somewhat	  greater	  degree	  of	  flexibility	  for	  the	  Iranian	  government	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  formulation	  of	  policy	  (Bakhash	  2001).	  This	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  a	  relaxation	  of	  revolutionary	  principles,	  resulting	  in	  moderates	  being	  elected	  President;	  Akbar	  Hashemi	  Rafsanjani	  assumed	  the	  presidency	  in	  1989	  and	  Mohammad	  Khatami	  in	  1997.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  their	  policy	  initiatives	  that	  were	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  period	  of	  moderation,	  Iran’s	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior	  became	  increasingly	  rational	  during	  the	  period	  1990-­‐2000	  (two	  decades	  after	  the	  revolution),	  as	  indicated	  by	  a	  lower	  CINC	  percentage	  (Appendix	  III).	  Seeking	  economic	  development,	  Rafsanjani	  proceeded	  to	  repair	  Iran’s	  foreign	  relations	  and	  pursue	  engagement	  with	  the	  West.	  Iran’s	  relaxation	  of	  revolutionary	  principles	  became	  evident	  on	  the	  international	  stage	  as	  Rafsanjani	  faced	  down	  opposition	  in	  the	  Majlis	  that	  pressed	  for	  an	  alliance	  with	  Iraq	  against	  the	  United	  States	  as	  the	  latter	  sought	  to	  expel	  the	  former	  from	  Kuwait	  in	  1990-­‐1991.	  Instead,	  he	  in	  effect	  sided	  with	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  American-­‐led	  coalition	  in	  seeking	  to	  expel	  Iraq	  (Bakhash	  2001).	  Rafsanjani	  additionally	  sought	  “critical	  dialogue”	  with	  the	  European	  Union	  (Rakel	  2007),	  resumed	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  Morocco,	  Egypt	  and	  Jordan	  and	  effectuated	  a	  release	  of	  American	  hostages	  in	  Lebanon,	  which	  is	  a	  testament	  to	  Iran’s	  moderation	  during	  this	  time.	  Engagement	  with	  the	  West	  ultimately	  resulted	  in	  the	  EU	  assisting	  Iran	  economically	  through	  rescheduling	  $12	  billion	  of	  Iranian	  debt	  as	  the	  country	  faced	  a	  balance	  of	  payments	  crisis	  (Bakhash	  2001).	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Khatami	  expanded	  upon	  Rafsanjani’s	  policy	  of	  engagement,	  having	  been	  elected	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  promise	  of	  political	  liberalization	  and	  a	  foreign	  policy	  of	  rapprochement.	  Khatami	  extended	  an	  olive	  branch	  to	  the	  United	  States	  in	  January	  1998	  calling	  for	  a	  “dialogue	  of	  civilizations”,	  which	  resulted	  in	  a	  series	  of	  exchanges,	  or	  so-­‐called	  people-­‐to-­‐people	  initiatives,	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  of	  academics,	  athletes	  and	  artists	  (Bakhash	  2001).	  In	  addition,	  Khatami	  visited	  a	  number	  of	  European	  states	  and	  improved	  relations	  with	  the	  Gulf	  states,	  including	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Qatar	  (Rakel	  2007).	  Accordingly,	  the	  1990-­‐2000	  period	  can	  be	  likened	  to	  Brinton’s	  phase	  of	  recovery.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  increased	  rationality	  in	  Iran’s	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior	  also	  was	  marred	  by	  a	  series	  of	  assassinations	  of	  Iranian	  dissidents	  in	  Europe,	  including	  France,	  Germany	  and	  Austria	  (Rakel	  2007).	  In	  addition,	  Supreme	  Leader	  Khamenei	  undermined	  Khatami’s	  efforts	  at	  improving	  relations	  with	  the	  United	  States	  by	  continuing	  to	  assist	  US	  designated	  terrorist	  groupings,	  including	  Hamas	  and	  Hezbollah,	  and	  to	  subscribe	  to	  strict	  anti-­‐American	  rhetoric	  (Rakel	  2007).	  As	  such,	  the	  period	  1990-­‐2000	  followed	  the	  pattern	  of	  a	  slow,	  uneven	  return	  to	  a	  relaxation	  of	  revolutionary	  principles,	  rather	  than	  a	  quick,	  radical	  transformation	  of	  the	  regime,	  but	  constituted	  a	  period	  of	  convalescence	  nonetheless.	  The	  assessment	  of	  Iranian	  foreign	  policy	  during	  this	  time	  and	  the	  empirical	  data,	  in	  any	  case,	  point	  to	  an	  increasingly	  rational	  Iran,	  rather	  than	  lending	  support	  to	  the	  supposedly	  suicidal	  state	  envisioned	  by	  Bernard	  Lewis.	  In	  fact,	  Podhoretz	  and	  Lewis’	  assertion	  that	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution	  has	  transformed	  the	  state	  of	  Iran	  into	  a	  uniquely	  irrational	  nation-­‐state	  that	  thus	  cannot	  be	  assessed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  historical	  precedents	  is	  severely	  undermined	  by	  the	  empirical	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evidence.	  I	  find	  that	  Iranian	  conflict	  initiations,	  on	  average,	  have	  occurred	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  rational	  behavior	  across	  all	  four	  time	  periods	  under	  consideration,	  which	  is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  irrationality	  threshold	  consistently	  exceeding	  that	  of	  Iran’s	  CINC	  percentages	  (Appendix	  III).	  The	  Islamic	  Republic	  moreover	  does	  not	  seem	  so	  unique	  once	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  with	  China	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  is	  employed.	  The	  results	  point	  to	  a	  convergence	  of	  Iran’s	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior	  with	  that	  of	  China	  and	  the	  USSR	  having	  occurred	  during	  the	  1990-­‐2000	  period.	  The	  average	  CINC	  percentage	  of	  Iran	  declined	  two	  decades	  after	  the	  revolution	  approaching	  China	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (Appendix	  III),	  two	  states	  that	  given	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  national	  capabilities	  have	  a	  far	  smaller	  pool	  of	  potential	  adversaries	  that	  would	  give	  rise	  to	  irrational	  conflict	  initiations	  (as	  defined	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  paper).	  As	  such,	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran	  is	  found	  to	  constitute	  a	  deterrable	  pragmatist,	  rather	  than	  an	  undeterrable	  ideologue.	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V.	  Conclusion	  	  	   Through	  analyzing	  the	  dyadic	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  Iranian	  conflict	  initiations,	  I	  find	  that	  Iran’s	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior	  became	  less	  rational	  in	  the	  decade	  succeeding	  the	  Islamic	  Revolution	  of	  1979,	  but	  that	  it	  thereafter	  became	  increasingly	  rational	  as	  the	  state	  entered	  a	  phase	  of	  recovery	  whereby	  revolutionary	  principles	  were	  relaxed.	  This	  reversal,	  rather	  than	  being	  the	  result	  of	  a	  drastic	  reevaluation	  of	  Iran’s	  geostrategic	  interests,	  was	  characterized	  by	  a	  slow,	  uneven	  return	  to	  quieter	  times	  caused	  by	  the	  pursuit	  of	  economic	  reinvigoration	  and	  facilitated	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Iran-­‐Iraq	  war	  and	  the	  death	  of	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini.	  Iranian	  foreign	  policy	  became	  less	  constrained	  by	  revolutionary	  fervor,	  which	  in	  turn	  allowed	  for	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  pragmatism	  for	  the	  government	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  formulation	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  Most	  importantly,	  the	  study	  finds	  that	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  of	  Iran	  fits	  the	  mold	  of	  a	  deterrable	  pragmatist,	  rather	  than	  comprising	  the	  undeterrable	  ideologue	  envisioned	  by	  Lewis	  and	  Podhoretz.	  The	  uniquely	  irrational	  state	  that	  they	  have	  themselves	  found	  in	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  is	  severely	  undermined	  by	  the	  empirical	  findings	  of	  this	  paper,	  which	  point	  to	  a	  convergence	  between	  Iran’s	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior	  and	  that	  of	  China	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s.	  Even	  more	  telling,	  I	  find	  that	  Iranian	  conflict	  initiations,	  on	  average,	  have	  occurred	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  rational	  behavior	  across	  each	  of	  the	  four	  time	  periods	  considered,	  suggesting	  that	  Iran	  is	  indeed	  a	  rational	  actor	  driven	  by	  material	  interests,	  first,	  and	  ideological	  considerations	  second,	  and	  thus	  can	  be	  deterred.	  	   Accordingly,	  my	  findings	  lend	  support	  to	  and	  reinforce	  the	  validity	  of	  deterrence	  theory	  in	  the	  debate	  regarding	  a	  potential	  Iranian	  nuclear	  weapon,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  the	  fundamental	  assumption	  that	  states	  act	  rationally.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  Iran	  comprises	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a	  revolutionary	  theocracy	  that	  is	  radically	  different	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  ideology	  compared	  to	  Western-­‐style	  democracies,	  the	  Islamic	  Republic	  is	  still	  bound	  by	  the	  same	  constraints	  under	  international	  anarchy	  as	  that	  of	  other	  states	  in	  that	  it	  ultimately	  seeks	  to	  ensure	  its	  own	  survival.	  The	  findings	  furthermore	  have	  an	  important	  policy	  implication	  as	  a	  result	  of	  ruling	  out	  the	  notion	  that	  Iran	  comprises	  a	  "messianic,	  apocalyptic,	  radical	  cult"	  (Haaretz	  2013).	  By	  suggesting	  that	  Iran	  constitutes	  a	  deterrable	  pragmatist,	  the	  empirical	  findings	  rule	  out	  the	  need	  for	  immediate	  air	  strikes	  by	  the	  United	  States	  of	  Iranian	  nuclear	  facilities	  for	  fear	  of	  the	  Iranian	  regime	  comprising	  an	  undeterrable	  ideologue.	  The	  results	  of	  my	  analysis	  point	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  conducting	  further	  research	  with	  regards	  to	  Iran’s	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior.	  This	  is	  particularly	  pertinent	  as	  the	  Correlates	  of	  War	  Project’s	  datasets	  upon	  which	  my	  quantitative	  analysis	  are	  based	  exclude	  the	  presidency	  of	  Mahmoud	  Ahmadinejad.	  As	  such,	  it	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  see	  whether	  Iran’s	  demonstrated	  relaxation	  of	  revolutionary	  principles	  and	  the	  increasing	  rationality	  of	  its	  conflict	  initiating	  behavior	  continued	  three	  decades	  after	  the	  revolution,	  or	  whether	  the	  Ahmadinejad	  era	  represents	  a	  break	  with	  this	  trend.	  Lastly,	  my	  empirical	  analysis	  illuminates	  the	  need	  for	  future	  research	  with	  regards	  to	  how	  to	  best	  construct	  reliable	  and	  efficient	  metrics	  for	  assessing	  rational	  decision-­‐making	  with	  respect	  to	  nation-­‐states.	  An	  inherent	  limitation	  of	  my	  definition	  of	  rational	  states	  as	  ones	  that	  do	  not	  initiate	  conflict	  against	  substantially	  more	  powerful	  states	  relates	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  more	  powerful	  states	  have	  a	  smaller	  pool	  of	  potential	  adversaries	  with	  which	  the	  initiation	  of	  disputes	  would	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  irrational.	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VI.	  Appendix	  	  
I.	  Total	  Number	  of	  Militarized	  Interstate	  Dispute	  Initiations	  over	  Time	  	  
	  
	  




















1957-­‐1967	   1968-­‐1978	   1979-­‐1989	   1990-­‐2000	  Proportion	  of	  irrational	  conqlicts	   Average	  hostility	  level	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III.	  Average	  Dyadic	  Balance	  of	  Power	  in	  Militarized	  Interstate	  Disputes	  (as	  measured	  by	  the	  defender’s	  percentage	  share	  of	  total	  capabilities)	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  after	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